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RECALIBRATING AFTER KIOBEL : EVALUATING
THE UTILITY OF THE RACKETEER
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
ACT (“RICO”) IN LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE ABUSE
Julian Simcock†
ABSTRACT
This analysis seeks to explore the unexamined question of whether
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO” or
“The Act”) could one day become a useful surrogate for the Alien Tort
Statute (“ATS”) in litigating international corporate abuses. Decades af-
ter the ATS became a robust tool for bringing claims for international
violations in U.S. courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit recently ruled in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. that cor-
porations cannot be held liable for torts in violation of the law of nations
under the ATS.1 Rulings by the D.C Circuit2 and the Seventh Circuit3
quickly breathed new life into the debate, and the circuit split is now
destined for resolution by the Supreme Court. Although the final outcome
is still unknown, Kiobel’s reverberations are already apparent. With
corporations potentially immune from the reach of the ATS, the search
has begun for vehicles by which to sustain momentum in litigating inter-
national corporate abuses.
Litigators have highlighted RICO as one potential alternative.4 Al-
though originally structured as a domestic device to combat organized
crime, over the past decade RICO has been deployed increasingly often in
litigation concerning international corporate abuse.5 This Note seeks to
† J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, M.P.P. Candidate, Harvard Kennedy
School, 2013. I would like to thank Jenny Martinez and Allen Weiner for helpful
guidance.
1 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011).
2 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11,15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[C]ontrary to
. . . the Second Circuit, we join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that neither the text,
history, nor purpose of the ATS supports corporate immunity for torts based on hei-
nous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of nations.”).
3 See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“All but one of the cases at our level hold or assume (mainly the latter) that corpora-
tions can be liable [under the ATS].”).
4 See Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1248–49 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (summary judgment order); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV.
8386(KMW), 2002 WL 319887, at *20–27 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
5 Id.
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explore the question of whether RICO is truly a useful tool for this realm
of litigation.
I have been unable to find any work that addresses this issue specif-
ically. Commentators have addressed the best manner in which to shape
RICO claims as an adjunct to ATS litigation,6 but never in isolation,
and never in a manner that tackles post-Kiobel implications. As I ex-
plain in this Note, Kiobel has added increased urgency to the search for
other strategies. Commentators have also addressed RICO’s applicability
to domestic corporations,7 and RICO’s use in casting a web of liability
across peripheral actors8—both of which I draw upon in my analysis.
None of these assessments, however, considers RICO’s utility in litigating
against such entities for actions committed abroad, an issue especially
worthy of exploration given the recent developments in ATS litigation.
This Note builds on work conducted by Beth Stephens concerning
the Alien Tort Statute.9 It also draws upon the work of Chime`ne Keitner
in helping to establish the context for why, given the complicated choice of
law debate that surrounds ATS litigation, the push toward RICO has
some understandable appeal.10 I use work by G. Robert Blakey, Professor
of Law at Notre Dame Law School and expert on RICO, to provide the
foundations for my assessment regarding the evolution of RICO’s domes-
tic application.11 Finally, from a practical perspective, this piece also
builds upon the litigating tactics that were deployed in two well-known
ATS cases: Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp.12 and Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.13 In both instances, the litigators supplemented
their ATS claims with RICO claims, providing the backdrop upon which
my analysis regarding RICO’s extraterritorial obstacles is formed.
I conclude that intuitions regarding RICO’s utility in this realm
have proven largely misguided. A thorough analysis of RICO’s structure,
evolution in domestic case law, and burgeoning use in cases concerning
international activity reveals that despite RICO’s appeal, it is a limited
tool for litigating against corporate abuse abroad. Although RICO offers
6 See BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS 42 (2d ed. 2008).
7 See e.g., G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 243 n.20 (1982).
8 See Sarah Baumgartel, The Crime of Associating with Criminals? An Argument for
Extending the Reves “Operation or Management” Test to RICO Conspiracy, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2006).
9 See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 6, at 42.
10 See Chime`ne I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 61, 62–65 (2008).
11 See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 7, at 307–325; see also G. Robert Blakey, On the Water-
front: RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341 (1980); G. Robert Blakey
& B. Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Con-
cepts–Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980).
12 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
13 No. 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
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several structural and remedial options that are helpful to litigators—
particularly for plaintiffs who have alleged economic claims, such as
injury to business or property—RICO’s disadvantages outweigh these
benefits. RICO provides a generally narrow set of remedial options, is
hamstrung by a more onerous test of extraterritorial jurisdiction than
that of its ATS counterpart, and—based on the trajectory of domestic
case law—will likely be of limited help in avoiding the complicated
choice of law issues which remain a part of ATS litigation. These find-
ings will remain true regardless of the way in which Kiobel may be
resolved by the Supreme Court. As a result, RICO claims are best used, if
at all, as an adjunct tactic to ATS litigation, rather than as the primary
thrust of legal strategy.
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INTRODUCTION
By almost any account, September 17, 2010 was a trying day
for public interest lawyers. Decades after the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”) had become a robust tool for bringing claims for interna-
tional violations in U.S. courts,14 the Second Circuit ruled in Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum that corporations cannot be held liable for
torts in violation of the law of nations under the ATS.15 Rulings by
the D.C. Circuit16 and the Seventh Circuit17 quickly breathed new
life into the debate, prompting the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari and resolve the split. But definitive answers were slow to arrive.
On March 5, 2012, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of
asking the parties to return with expanded arguments.18 It called
upon parties to address the following question in a revised round
of briefing: “Whether and under what circumstances the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the terri-
tory of a sovereign other than the United States.”19
The reverberations are already apparent. While the ATS had
previously allowed litigators to bring civil actions in U.S. courts for
a small range of violations against the law of nations, if the Second
Circuit’s ruling prevails, corporate entities will be largely out of
reach. In fact, given the nature of the Court’s March 5th order, the
ramifications may be even more expansive: the Alien Tort Statute
may be seriously circumscribed even in its applicability to non-cor-
porate actors. Accordingly, as the parties in Kiobel push forward,
litigators in the broader community appear to be undergoing a re-
calibration—a search for alternative vehicles by which to sustain
14 The ATS had existed for over 200 years, yet the statute had received little atten-
tion until 1976, when a team of enterprising lawyers employed the device on behalf of
a Paraguayan client seeking justice for the torture and murder of her husband. Their
efforts led to the landmark decision, Fila´rtiga v. Pen˜a-Irala, which expressly enabled
the victims of international rights violations to bring civil actions in U.S. federal
courts. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
15 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2011).
16 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09–7125 2011 WL 2652384 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“[C]ontrary to . . . the Second Circuit, we join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that
neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports corporate immunity for
torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the
law of nations.”).
17 See Flomo v. Firestone, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011) (“All but one of the
cases at our level hold or assume (mainly the latter) that corporations can be liable
[under the ATS]”).
18 Order In Pending Case, 565 U.S. __ (Mar. 5, 2012) (available at http://sblog.s3.
amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/10-1491-order-rearg-3-5-12.pdf).
19 Id.
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the momentum in litigating corporate involvement in extraterrito-
rial abuses. If the Supreme Court endorses the Second Circuit’s
ruling on the issue, or if it limits the ATS more broadly, the search
for alternatives will develop a renewed sense of urgency.
While practitioners may struggle to find a vehicle with the
same potency as the ATS, litigators have highlighted the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) as a potential
alternative.20 Although originally structured as a domestic device to
combat organized crime, over the past decade RICO has been
deployed increasingly often in litigation concerning international
corporate abuse.21
The analysis herein seeks to explore the unexamined question
of whether RICO could one day prove a useful surrogate for ATS
litigation. A thorough analysis of RICO’s structure, evolution in do-
mestic case law, and burgeoning use in cases concerning interna-
tional activity, reveals that despite RICO’s intuitive appeal, it is a
limited tool for litigating against corporate abuse abroad. Although
RICO offers several structural and remedial options that are help-
ful to litigators—particularly for plaintiffs who have alleged eco-
nomic claims, such as injury to business or property—RICO’s
disadvantages outweigh these benefits. The Act provides a gener-
ally narrow set of remedial options, is hamstrung by a more oner-
ous test of extraterritorial jurisdiction than that of its ATS
counterpart, and—based on the trajectory of domestic case law—
will likely be of limited help in avoiding the complicated choice of
law issues which remain a part of ATS litigation. These findings will
remain true regardless of the way Kiobel is resolved by the Supreme
Court. As a result, RICO claims are best used, if at all, as an adjunct
tactic to ATS litigation, rather than as the primary thrust of legal
strategy.
A. The Evolution of ATS Litigation and the Search for New Methods
Although Kiobel has given the search for alternative litigation
strategies new urgency, the trend was well underway before the Sec-
ond Circuit’s decision. Almost two decades after the resurrection
of the ATS enabled the victims of international human rights viola-
tions to bring civil actions in federal courts,22 two trends in ATS
20 See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1248-49 (N.D.
Cal. 2004); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL
319887, at *20–27 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
21 See cases cited supra note 20.
22 See Fila´rtiga v. Pen˜a-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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litigation led litigators to reach for supplemental tactics. First, ATS-
related litigation shifted increasingly from individuals and govern-
ment officials to corporate entities.23 Unlike earlier ATS cases, this
recent wave of claims pose substantial economic consequences that
cannot easily be shirked in the event of adverse judgments.24 Sec-
ond, corporate-based ATS litigation hinges more often on proving
a company’s complicity in torts, rather than ascribing fault for the
direct perpetration of crimes. This process requires parsing a com-
plicated and largely unresolved choice of law question;25 and, in
turn, proving the existence of the requisite mental state associated
with that standard.26 In particular, courts have split on whether to
employ a purposefulness standard in cases involving international
accomplice liability, or whether knowledge should suffice as the
requisite mental state.27
B. Exploring RICO as a Potential Alternative
Originally designed as a legislative response to the growing
problem of organized crime, RICO has since been used to target
the criminal activities of unions,28 abortion protest groups,29 and a
wide range of corporate entities.30 The well-documented flexibility
of RICO as a tool for ascribing liability to individuals who are re-
moved from the direct perpetration of crimes has led some com-
mentators to suggest that the Act may be an appropriate vehicle by
which to pursue corporate involvement in international abuses.31
In light of these suggestions, and in the context of the broader
shifts taking place in ATS litigation, a closer reevaluation of RICO
is instructive.
23 See David Wallach, The Alien Tort Statute and the Limits of Individual Accountability
in International Law, 46 STANFORD INT’L L. J. 121, 129 (2010).
24 This is unlike many of the default judgments awarded against former govern-
ment officials in the earlier rounds of ATS cases. Many of the defendants refused to
remain in the U.S. to defend against claims, and in the event that a final judgment
was awarded against them, few had the financial means with which to adequately com-
pensate the victims. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 6, at 42.
25 Chime`ne Keitner has provided a considered view of both sides in this debate. See
Chime`ne Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61,
62–65 (2008).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See Yellow Bus Lines v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union, 639 F.2d
782, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
29 See Nat’l Org. For Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
30  See, e.g., Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 74 F. Supp.
2d 221, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S.
229, 244 (1989).
31 See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 6, at 113–17.
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The contours of this analysis include four parts. Part I explores
the congressional history and statutory language of RICO, as well
as some of the reasons why RICO’s structure lends itself to an intui-
tive, if ultimately misguided, application to multinational corporate
abuses. My assessment in this Part focuses largely on RICO’s posi-
tive characteristics in pursuing the type of claims often involved in
ATS litigation. It also provides context for why the decision regard-
ing whether to employ RICO in such circumstances is not straight-
forward, and worthy of exploration. Part II explores the evolution
of RICO in domestic litigation, and illustrates that although RICO
is well designed for litigation against corporate defendants, domes-
tic case law has substantially limited the Act’s remedial offerings.
Part III examines RICO’s use in litigation regarding international
abuses, and the considerable difficulties involved in establishing
extraterritorial jurisdiction under RICO. Finally, Part IV assesses
the potential value of RICO as a method of avoiding the more com-
plicated choice of law debate regarding complicity liability. It con-
cludes that based on domestic jurisprudence, RICO is unlikely to
allow for a more direct avenue of ascribing liability, leaving liti-
gators once again embroiled in the choice of law debate which con-
tinues to frustrate ATS litigation.
PART I: STATUTORY HISTORY AND LANGUAGE—RICO’S INTUITIVE, IF
ULTIMATELY MISLEADING, APPEAL IN LITIGATING AGAINST
CORPORATE MULTINATIONALS
A. RICO’s Congressional History
In 1970, Congress passed RICO as a response to the growing
domestic problem of organized crime. The Act was designed to
prohibit “conducting or conspiring to conduct the affairs of an en-
terprise engaged in (or whose activities affect) interstate commerce
‘through a pattern of racketeering activity.’”32 The political impe-
tus behind RICO is expressly depicted in the congressional record
at the time: “Congress finds that organized crime in the United
States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity
that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy by
unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and
corruption.”33
Congress also highlighted the legal system’s increasingly ap-
32 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2006).
33 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (State-
ment of Findings and Purpose).
450 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:443
parent deficiencies: “organized crime continues to grow because of
defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the
development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring
criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the
sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unneces-
sarily limited in scope and impact.”34 In short, the federal justice
system was grappling with a new species of criminal entity—one in
which key decision makers were largely removed from the ground-
level crimes which their organizations perpetrated. As a result, a
new legislative device, replete with the capacity to link multiple
parties together in the form of an “enterprise,” and able to identify
“patterns of activity,” became necessary to counteract the threat. As
will be explained, these characteristics are an important part of un-
derstanding why RICO has generated appeal as one method of liti-
gating against multinational corporations.
Debate continues regarding the original intent behind RICO’s
extraterritorial applicability, and also the intended scope of its re-
medial possibilities, both of which are addressed later in this analy-
sis. For now, however, it bears mentioning that from a structural
perspective, the congressional intent underlying RICO does appear
to align with the Act’s use in litigation against multinational corpo-
rate defendants. One of Congress’s primary goals was to bridge the
evidentiary distance between the decision makers and the crimes
themselves. This problem continues to frustrate litigators in pursu-
ing claims against corporate defendants abroad, which, given the
contractual nature of most of their activities, are more likely to be
peripherally, rather than directly, involved in the perpetration of
the alleged crimes.
B. Statutory Language
Even before RICO’s evolution into a tool for litigation beyond
traditional notions of organized crime, the plain language of the
statute provides several potent enforcement mechanisms for ascrib-
ing liability. RICO outlines four substantive violations: the first
three define the substantive offenses of the Act, and the fourth
makes it a crime to conspire to violate any of the three preceding.35
Subsections (a) and (b) are primarily aimed at the tendency for
organized crime to take over otherwise legitimate businesses.36 As a
34 Id.
35 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(d).
36 Subsection (a) states in part, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who has
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result, although these sections have been used in some litigation
against corporate defendants, they are more appropriate as a
means of targeting crime syndicates—i.e., wholly illegitimate enter-
prises—which are attempting to influence or acquire otherwise le-
gitimate businesses.
The third subsection, however, works in reverse. Rather than
focus on the illegal takeover of a business, it applies when a busi-
ness—or an employee of the business—begins to conduct its affairs
in a way that qualifies as racketeering. It states in part that “[i]t
shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering . . . .”37 In this regard, “section 1962(c) aims at corrup-
tion of the enterprise from within.”38 To that end, subsection (c)
provides a more obvious tool by which to target corporations en-
gaged in international abuses. When an employee of a multina-
tional firm with otherwise legitimate business practices begins to
conduct her work using, or conspiring to use, methods which qual-
ify as racketeering, the possibility of a RICO violation surfaces.
C. Predicate Offenses—What Counts as “Racketeering”?
As far as what constitutes racketeering, subsection 1961 of the
Act provides a lengthy and specific list. Racketeering activity
“means . . . any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gam-
bling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in obscene
matter . . . [or controlled substances], which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt . . . to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.” Id. § 1962(a).
Subsection (b) takes this regulation one step further, prohibiting the direct acquisi-
tion of a business through racketeering, rather than the indirect investment of ille-
gally obtained funds. It states in part that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”
Id. § 1962(b). Combined, these subsections prevent organizations both from launder-
ing illegally obtained profits through the acquisition of legitimate businesses, and also
from obtaining legitimate businesses through more assertive means (via coercion,
threats, or pressure regarding “unlawful debts,” for example).
37 Id. § 1962(c).
38 KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed.
2012).
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. . . .”39 In addition, any act which is indictable under Title 18 of the
U.S. Code can constitute racketeering, including, among others,
“bribery, counterfeiting, theft from interstate shipment . . . obstruc-
tion of justice, obstruction of criminal investigations . . . [and] in-
terstate transportation of stolen property.”40
With an eye toward the Act’s potential applicability in cases
against multinational corporations, the intuitive appeal is once
again understandable. Many of the claims that have been brought
under ATS cases (and other human rights litigation) are featured
as predicate offenses under RICO as well. Specifically, the acts of
murder, robbery, bribery, extortion, obstruction of criminal investi-
gations, and transportation of stolen property are all either forms
of international human rights abuses, or activities which take place
frequently in the context of such abuses.
These advantages, however, are tempered somewhat by
RICO’s requirement that there be a “pattern” of racketeering activ-
ity. Section 1961 of the Act defines a “pattern of racketeering activ-
ity” as requiring “at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last
of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of im-
prisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity.”41
The flexibility of the pattern requirement is in keeping with
Congress’s larger intention to create a dynamic and functional law
enforcement tool. Recent court rulings, however, have provided
some limitations regarding how far the concept can be stretched.
Courts have looked in particular for both a numeracy variable
(how many times has the action taken place?), and a qualitative
relatedness variable (do the acts have some sort of common rela-
tionship?).42 In Sedima v. Imrex Co., the Supreme Court established
“that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient.”43 On
the other hand, there also need not be a temporal separation be-
tween the acts. In United States v. Indelicato, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that in some circumstances a pattern of ac-
tivity “may be found. . . in the simultaneous commission of like acts
39 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (2006).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Robert Weisberg provides a comprehensive discussion of the vagaries associated
with defining a pattern which meets the concepts of both continuity and relatedness.
See KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 38, at 9.
43 Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
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for similar purposes against a number of victims.”44 The Supreme
Court’s ruling in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Co. added much
needed clarity when it articulated a six-step process to identify
when continuity and relatedness were both present.45 The test con-
tinues to allow litigators substantial flexibility, and has reduced
confusion regarding how best to identify a pattern. To determine
the qualitative relationship component of the pattern, the test al-
lows litigators to prove merely that the acts are “related to an exter-
nal organizing principle.”46 Equally important, with regard to the
quantitative component, the ruling appears to leave the Indelicato
standard largely intact. That is, if a threat of continuity can be in-
ferred from acts that occurred simultaneously, the requisite con-
tinuity component has been met and the existence of a pattern can
still be established.
In the context of the difficulties that ATS litigators have faced,
the predicate offenses enumerated under RICO are once again un-
derstandably appealing. The Act, by contrast to the ATS, provides a
lengthy and specific list of violations that fall under its purview.
Moreover, the evolution of domestic case law has continued to al-
low great flexibility in establishing a “pattern”—so much so that a
pattern may be established via the simultaneous occurrence of acts
which feature only some relation to an “external organizing
principle.”
D. The Flexibility of the Term “Enterprise” as Applied to Corporate
Defendants
Finally, a lengthy precedential history places a range of corpo-
rations and corporate activity well within RICO’s reach.47 Much of
this can be traced to the flexibility of the term “enterprise.”48 In
United States v. Cauble, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
44 United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir. 1989).
45 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242–44 (1989).
46 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238.
47 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (1985); Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1381; H.J. Inc., 492
U.S. at 244.
48 Some of this flexibility can be attributed to the range of uses depicted in the
statute itself. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006). As recent scholarship has noted, enterprise
is used in at least four different ways in Section 1962 alone: it is, in various contexts, a
“prize,” an “instrument,” a “victim,” and a “perpetrator.” See e.g., Blakey, supra note 7,
at 307–25; Blakey, supra note 11, at 341; Blakey & Gettings, supra note 11, at 1009.
Section 1961 provides a list of groups which fall under the definition, which “includes
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 (2006). As denoted by the term “includes,” Congress appears to have intended
that this be an illustrative rather than exhaustive list.
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RICO applies to “enterprise criminality” broadly, which consists of
“all types of organized criminal behavior . . . from simple political
corruption to sophisticated white-collar crime schemes . . . .”49
More importantly, the term enterprise extends beyond corpora-
tions that are wholly illegitimate or corrupt. The Supreme Court’s
holding in Sedima v. Imrex Co. placed otherwise respectable busi-
nesses squarely within RICO’s reach if they were found to be en-
gaging in criminal activity.50 Although the Court acknowledged
that “in its private civil action, RICO [was] evolving into something
quite different from the original conception of its enactors,”51 it
nevertheless resisted calls to curb the Act’s application. In over-
turning the lower court’s ruling, the Court interpreted congres-
sional intent expansively:
[C]ongress wanted to reach both ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’
enterprises. The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for
criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences. The fact
that § 1964(c) is used against respected businesses allegedly en-
gaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is
hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is be-
ing misconstrued.52
The court based this evolution largely on the “breadth of the
predicate offenses” which included such corporate-oriented activi-
ties as “wire, mail and securities fraud.”53
The Court’s expansive interpretation in Sedima was once again
based on both the intentions of Congress in enacting RICO, and
also the inference to be drawn from Congress’s use of a wide list of
predicate offenses to constitute racketeering. This precedential his-
tory has enabled litigators to employ RICO as a potent tool for do-
mestic litigation against corporate defendants. As the following
parts depict, however, RICO’s intuitive structural appeal is eventu-
ally outweighed by other limitations. In particular, the Act’s limited
remedial advantages, burdensome requirements for extraterritorial
jurisdiction, and inability to avoid the complex choice of conspir-
acy law debate, all serve to frustrate the Act’s utility in litigating
against corporate multinationals.
49 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Blakey & Gettings, supra note 11,
at 1013–14).
50 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499–500.
51 Id. at 500.
52 Id. at 499.
53 See id. at 500.
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PART II. THE EVOLUTION OF RICO IN DOMESTIC CASE LAW—
A TOOL WITH LIMITED REMEDIAL OPTIONS
As noted, the application of RICO has become more expan-
sive, reaching beyond traditional notions of organized crime to a
variety of conceptions of criminal enterprise. Despite these advan-
tages, however, the scope of RICO’s civil remedies has received a
much narrower interpretation by U.S. courts. The result is that
while RICO’s wide applicability to corporations is helpful, the
scope of its civil remedies substantially narrows the pool of plain-
tiffs that can receive compensation.
A. RICO’s Limited Remedial Scope
RICO’s interpretation in domestic case law has substantially
limited its remedial advantages. As previously mentioned, RICO
provides for a civil remedy at law. Section 1964(a) of the Act gives
courts the power to award injunctive relief including “prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the en-
terprise engaged in . . . or ordering dissolution or reorganization
of any enterprise.”54 In some circumstances, RICO also stipulates
the possibility of substantial punitive damages, including “threefold
the damages [sustained]” as well as “the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee.”55 This provision, however, is reserved
only for individuals who have been “injured in [their] business or
property.”56 The manner in which this latter restriction has been
interpreted by courts substantially limits the Act’s potential for gar-
nering remuneration in cases involving multinational corporate
abuse.
With regard to seeking compensation for injuries (rather than
injunctive relief) the enumerated categories of “injury to business”
and “injury to property” provide obvious restrictions. Their inclu-
sion makes clear that Congress was intending to compensate vic-
tims for a somewhat narrowly tailored type of harm, such as
innocent business owners who had lost their profits (or worse)
through acts of racketeering. This restriction sits in contrast, how-
ever, to an uncodified portion of the RICO statute in which Con-
gress articulates its intention that RICO “be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes.”57 This juxtaposition has provided
54 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2006).
55 Id. § 1964(c).
56 Id.
57 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970) (codified with some differ-
ences in language at 18 U.S.C. § 1961).
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ample room for disagreement among courts regarding how far to
extend the scope of what constitutes a business or property related
injury.58
Despite this congressional guidance, courts have almost uni-
formly held that personal injuries do not qualify as injuries to busi-
ness or property.59 As such, these elements appear to restrict the
pool of potentially successful plaintiffs to those who had some form
of objective economic interest at stake. In fact, the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits have gone so far as to interpret injury to business
or property as a requisite to establish standing, rather than an ele-
ment of the cause of action.60 Although the most expansive of ex-
isting interpretations permits the inclusion of “employment losses”
under the category of “business,” and also includes “intangible
items” under the category of “property,” none appear to provide
for the possibility of reparation for personal injury itself.61
The extent to which plaintiffs can recover from economic
losses which flow from personal injuries is the subject of greater
debate. Yet the weight of authority once again leans toward a nar-
row remedial scope. In Grogan v. Platt, the Eleventh Circuit consid-
ered claims from the estates of F.B.I. agents that had been
murdered in a gun battle with suspected bank robbers.62 The plain-
tiff estates sought, among other claims, compensation for the re-
sulting economic losses of the murders, including lost wages and
funeral expenses.63 The court engaged in a lengthy interpretation
of congressional intent, and ultimately concluded that while the
plaintiffs’ argument had “some merit,” Congress had not intended
RICO to provide this manner of remedy.64 The court therefore af-
firmed the district court’s summary judgment against the plaintiffs
as to their RICO claims.65
Although this decision has been followed by other courts seek-
ing to parse the scope of RICO’s remedies,66 it has also met with
substantial criticism. In National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v.
58 See Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1248-49 (N.D. Cal.
2004); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL
319887, at *20–27 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
59 See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 11, at 1013–14.
60 See Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2006); Grogan v. Platt,
835 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1988).
61 See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 6, at 116.
62 Grogan, 835 F.2d at 845.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 846–48.
65 Id. at 848.
66 See, e.g., Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 930 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Phillip Morris, Inc., the Eastern District of New York considered
claims from a group of plaintiffs who managed self-insured trust
funds that provided health care benefits to union workers.67 The
plaintiffs sought compensation under RICO for the “economic in-
juries associated with treatment of smoking related injuries.”68 By
contrast to Grogan, the court upheld the plaintiffs’ claims, and de-
livered an emphatic endorsement of RICO’s ability to compensate
victims for economic losses which derive from personal injury:
The recovery of pecuniary losses associated with physical injuries
directly caused by racketeering conduct is consistent with the
language of the RICO statute. Such claims, furthermore, would
materially advance the statute’s legislative purposes of deterring
racketeering, in all its forms, and of remedying, as fully as practi-
cable, the economic consequences of racketeering.”69
Despite this isolated example, however, successful efforts to estab-
lish standing through the economic damages which flow from per-
sonal injury are rare. Contrary to the holding in National Asbestos
Workers Medical Fund, the more restrictive Grogan ruling has found
enduring traction in modern RICO cases.70
B. A Narrower Class of Parties Eligible for Relief
Placing these holdings in the context of claims against mul-
tinational corporations, it becomes clear that the pool of applicants
capable of garnering compensation via RICO is limited. A business
or landowner who, in the course of suffering abuses, lost either
business or property holdings, would likely fall under the purview
of RICO’s civil remedies. But the more common profiles—individ-
uals who have sought the help of litigators by virtue of the human
suffering they have incurred—fall largely outside the realm of
RICO’s civil compensation provision. This does not, of course, re-
strict RICO’s remedial scope to a point of complete futility. The
67 74 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
68 Id. at 229.
69 Id. This perspective found similar traction in Libertad v. Welch, a First Circuit
ruling concerning claims from women who had sought reproductive health services at
blockaded clinics and had been intimidated by protestors outside. 53 F.3d 428 (1st
Cir. 1995). Although the court ultimately found that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they claimed no injuries beyond general intimidation and harassment, the
opinion suggested that economic injuries, and even physical injury itself, would have
been sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 437. The court held that “Plaintiffs. . . could
have standing to sue under RICO, if they were to submit sufficient evidence of injury
to business or property such as lost wages or travel expenses, actual physical harm, or
specific property damage sustained as a result of a RICO defendant’s actions.” Id. at
437 n.4.
70 See, e.g., Evans, 434 F.3d at 924–25.
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option to recover damage to business or property is not provided
for under the ATS, as courts have generally held that property
claims do not meet the requisite standards of a “widely accepted,
clearly defined violation of the law of nations.”71 Rather than pur-
suing RICO as a primary legal tactic, however, litigators should
consider its utility as an adjunct strategy to ATS claims. In doing so,
they both broaden the scope of claims that can be made, and also
slightly expand their remedial opportunities. Moreover, as the fol-
lowing sections depict, the onerous requirements of establishing
jurisdiction, coupled with RICO’s limited advantages for ascribing
liability, further establish that RICO claims are not worth pursuing
in isolation.
PART III. LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL ABUSES WITH RICO—THE
OBSTACLE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Although RICO has enjoyed burgeoning use in the realm of
international litigation, the case law in this area is sparser than in
the domestic arena. This paucity is further compounded by the
lack of final judgments available—in several instances, although
RICO claims have survived early motions for summary judgment,
parties have agreed upon a settlement before a final verdict is
reached. From the limited amount of case law that is available,
however, the requirements for establishing extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion under RICO have emerged as a substantial obstacle, signifi-
cantly more onerous than the steps necessary to establish
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ATS. In Bowoto v. Chevron Tex-
aco Corp. and in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum—which both featured
alleged abuses by extraction companies in the Niger Delta—the
plaintiffs’ RICO claims survived the initial rounds of pleading.72
This progress elicited hopeful commentary from human rights pro-
ponents.73 A more complete evaluation, however, reveals that the
claims did not survive long. In both cases, RICO claims were dis-
missed for failure to uncover sufficient evidence during discovery
to substantiate extraterritorial jurisdiction.74 The courts demon-
71 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 710–14 (2004).
72 See Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1248–49 (N.D. Cal.
2004); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL
319887, at *20–27 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
73 See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 6, at 114.
74 See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ.
1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 928297, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
18, 2009) (consolidating the three claims brought by Mr. Wiwa and granting defend-
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strated a tendency to seek guidance in antitrust and securities law
for a framework by which to evaluate RICO’s extraterritorial
reach.75 These frameworks place heavy burdens on litigators at
early stages of the case, rendering RICO claims less appealing than
their ATS counterpart in this regard.
Before examining these cases, it should be noted that the stat-
utory language of RICO itself is largely silent with regard to extra-
territorial jurisdiction.76 Although it features repeated references
to activities which effect “foreign commerce,” courts have been ret-
icent to hear suits in which the transaction or activities only “casu-
ally touch upon the United States.”77 Instead, the prevailing
inquiry, as articulated by the Second Circuit in North South Fin.
Corp. v. Al-Turki, is whether “Congress would have wished the pre-
cious resources of the United States courts” to be dedicated to the
activities at issue.78 With regard to litigation against corporations,
this standard has been operationalized in two tests, both of which
derive from securities and antitrust law: the conduct test and the
effects test.
A. The Conduct Test
The conduct test requires the defendant to have committed
activities inside the United States which “materially furthered the
unlawful scheme.”79 The Ninth Circuit has held that in order for
the conduct to be sufficient to establish jurisdiction, it “cannot be
merely preparatory.”80 This latter stipulation proved critical in
Bowoto, a case that was filed by a group of Nigerian nationals seek-
ants’ motion to dismiss exterritorial RICO claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
75 See cases cited supra note 74.
76 In addition, this analysis assumes that personal jurisdiction has been estab-
lished, preferring instead to focus on the disproportionate standards between estab-
lishing subject matter jurisdiction between RICO and the ATS. Personal jurisdiction,
however, has also been the subject of some difficulty in both ATS and RICO claims. In
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell, for example, a district court found forum non conveniens in
1998 and directed that future litigation take place in London. On appeal, however,
this decision was reversed, allowing the case to continue on U.S. soil. See Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
77 Brink’s Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990).
78 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975)) (“[T]he ultimate inquiry is . . . whether ‘Congress would
have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement
agencies to be devoted to [foreign transactions] rather than leave the problem to
foreign countries.’”) (alterations in original).
79 STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 6, at 119, citing to Butte Mining, PLC v. Smith, 76
F.3d 287 (9th Cir. 1996).
80 See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1983).
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ing to recover for a series of attacks at Chevron Nigeria’s extraction
facilities in the Niger Delta.81 The plaintiffs, together with a group
of over 100 local community members, had occupied the platform
of one of Chevron’s barges.82 They alleged that after several days
on the platform, Chevron Nigeria solicited the help of Nigerian
Government security forces to remove the defendants, leading to
the killing of several protestors and the torture of another protes-
tor while in custody.83
Despite the plaintiffs’ lengthy account of the connections be-
tween the conduct of the defendant’s offices in the United States
and the alleged attacks in Nigeria, the court held that the corpora-
tion’s actions in the United States were “‘merely preparatory,’ and
not a ‘direct cause’ of the attacks.”84 The plaintiffs presented evi-
dence that the defendants’ office in the United States had a sub-
stantial range of control over the Nigerian based subsidiary. This
included having “designed and adjusted the general security poli-
cies,” maintaining “general control and supervision” over the sub-
sidiary, and also engaging in a robust “media campaign to cover up
[the subsidiary’s] involvement in the attacks.”85 Regardless, the
court dismissed these connections as insufficient to constitute “ma-
terial” conduct, and reiterated its earlier assessment that “the evi-
dence produced by plaintiffs reflects not that defendants made
decisions during the attacks, but that there was an extraordinarily
close relationship between the parents and the subsidiary prior to,
during and after the attacks.”86 The Bowoto ruling, as a result, sets a
difficult evidentiary standard in order to satisfy the conduct test.
Short of a direct and well-documented order which instructs the
international subsidiary to engage in, or pay for, activities which
constitute a human rights abuse, establishing sufficient conduct to
warrant extraterritorial jurisdiction is unlikely.
B. The Effects Test
Unfortunately for litigators, the effects test provides little addi-
tional flexibility. In Wiwa, despite allowing the RICO allegations to
survive the pleading stage, the court eventually granted a summary
judgment motion on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not estab-
lished “sufficient effects in the United States to give the Court sub-
81 See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1015.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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ject matter jurisdiction.”87 Wiwa was one of three lawsuits brought
against the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, as well as several of
the company’s employees and subsidiaries, alleging the corpora-
tion’s complicity in human rights abuses in the Niger Delta.88 Al-
though a wide range of claims were filed, including environmental
damage, bribery, and obstruction of justice, the most severe allega-
tions concerned Shell’s complicity in the arrest and execution of
the “Ogoni 9”—a group of nine activists who had protested Shell’s
activities in the region as part of a broader community of
protestors.89
In its assessment of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the court ac-
knowledged the paucity of litigation on the subject and also the
lack of clarity regarding which standard to apply.90 Like the Bowoto
ruling, however, the court once again sought guidance in “prece-
dents concerning subject matter jurisdiction for international se-
curities transactions and antitrust matters.”91 The Wiwa ruling
spliced the tests one step further, stating that the effects test can be
further subdivided into the “securities-based effects test” on one
hand, in which “Plaintiffs must show substantial, direct effects on
the United States,” and the “antitrust based effects test,” on the
other, in which plaintiffs must demonstrate “intentional, actual,
and substantial effects on United States imports and exports.”92
In Wiwa, the plaintiffs sought to establish effects in the United
States through the impact which the actions of the Nigerian subsid-
iary had on the profits of the United States parent company. Spe-
cifically, the plaintiffs alleged that racketeering activity had allowed
the corporation to avoid several activities which would have jeop-
ardized profits, including:  agreeing to the demands of the activists;
addressing the environmental hazards the corporation had cre-
ated; and generally allowing their “manner of operations” and “in-
ternational position” to be challenged by the activist movement.93
The corporation’s ability to smother these activities, the plaintiffs
alleged, allowed the corporation to import Nigerian oil into the
United States at a lower cost, thereby increasing profits and al-
87 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ.
1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 928297, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
18, 2009).
88 Id. at *1–3.
89 Id. at *2–3.
90 Id. at *11.
91 Id. (quoting North South Fin. Corp. v. Al Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir.
1996)).
92 Id. at *4.
93 See Wiwa 2009 WL 928297 at *5.
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lowing the corporation to “sell stocks and American Depository Re-
ceipts in the United States that offered investors a higher margin of
return than they would have had if Defendants had met [the activ-
ists’ demands].”94
These arguments failed to resonate. As the court explained,
despite the plaintiffs’ assertions, there was no evidence that the de-
fendants’ actions had contributed to an increase in investment re-
turns or profits. Specifically, the plaintiffs had failed to establish
“either (1) that Defendants’ alleged racketeering activity lowered
their costs of producing oil in Nigeria . . . or (2) if Defendants did
have lower production costs in Nigeria, that these lower costs re-
sulted in greater investment returns or otherwise affected com-
merce in the United States.”95 The latter of these two conclusions
appears to pose a unique and especially intractable obstacle for liti-
gators seeking to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction via the ef-
fects test. Prior to the Wiwa holding, it might have appeared
reasonable to assume that a multinational corporation which ag-
gregates profits from a range of international subsidiaries will ben-
efit by at least some margin if one of its subsidiaries has managed to
lower production costs. Although the absolute sum of profits from
the corporation’s international subsidiaries may remain un-
changed when they are pooled, the fact that one division’s increase
in profit might be off-set by another division’s loss should not dis-
count the reality that the corporation has still felt the “effects” of
the increased profit margins from its Nigerian operations. The
court’s conclusion, however, appears to suggest the opposite. It
states that even in the event that the defendants are able to prove
that production costs in Nigeria have been lowered through racke-
teering activity, defendants must also have demonstrable evidence
of the effect—presumably through incremental profit increases or
a shift in the corporation’s share price—of the increased returns to
the parent company in the United States. If this holding proves
durable through subsequent judgments in international RICO
cases, the standard it sets will remain an onerous obstacle for
human rights litigators to overcome.
With regard to the alternative test articulated in the Wiwa
holding—the antitrust-based effects test—the plaintiffs’ evidence
fared no better.96 The court reiterated a similar argument, stating
94 Id. at *6.
95 Id.
96 In Bowoto, the court’s analysis of the antitrust effects test was nearly identical:
Plaintiffs fail, however, to provide any evidence that defendants’ treat-
ment of the environment, the local community, oil protestors generally,
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that “even assuming that Defendants’ alleged racketeering activity
lowered their Nigerian production costs, Plaintiffs provide no spe-
cific evidence that these lower costs resulted in lower oil prices or
higher investment returns in the United States.”97 Although the
court did not find it necessary to reach the question of whether or
not “intent” had been established, it did provide some guidance
for future litigation in this regard. The court noted that because
the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the proportion of Nigerian
oil that had been exported to the United States, there was insuffi-
cient evidence to “establish that the Defendants undertook their
alleged racketeering activity in order to affect the United States, in
addition to, or as opposed to, other countries.”98 Should future
holdings stipulate that the antitrust test is a more apposite evalua-
tion, litigants will be faced with the obvious difficulty of proving
not only the effects mentioned above, but also the underlying in-
tent of the corporation to bring about such effects. In any event,
the antitrust-based test appears to mirror the difficult obstacles pro-
vided by the securities-based test. Both require litigators to isolate
an incrementally identifiable chain of connections from a complex
and opaque operating environment.
C. A Comparison to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the ATS
Regardless of which test litigants employ to establish extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, the expectations on the litigator are substan-
tially more cumbersome than that of establishing extraterritorial
jurisdiction under ATS litigation. This held true even before Kiobel
introduced the possibility that corporate complicity falls entirely
outside the realm of the statute. The language of the ATS states
that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
or these specific plaintiffs, generated any impact on the United States
economy. Plaintiffs state that “[s]uppressing protest allows defendants
to escape paying for measures that would avoid and remediate the
harms caused by extraction, thereby lowering the cost of extraction and
increasing profits earned by defendants from the sale of Nigerian oil in
the U.S.” Plaintiffs’ statement, however, lacks any evidentiary support.
Plaintiffs present no evidence that killing or otherwise suppressing
protestors saves defendants money, or otherwise increases their profit
margin. Plaintiffs therefore fail to present evidence that defendants
gained a competitive advantage in the United States, or impacted the
U.S. economy, by engaging in the alleged racketeering activity.
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1014–15 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
97 See Wiwa, 2009 WL 928297, at *8.
98 Id. at *8 n.20 (emphasis added).
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nations or a treaty of the United States.”99 There is some debate as
to whether the term “violation” mandates that courts engage in a
more “searching preliminary review of the merits than is required,
for example, under the more flexible ‘arising under’ formula-
tion.”100 Yet this assertion has been countered on the basis that it
“appears to conflate subject matter jurisdiction and whether plain-
tiffs have stated a claim for relief.”101 Under the latter interpreta-
tion, the plaintiff need only allege an “arguable violation of the law
of nations” in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction.102 The
trend, in fact, appears to be in the direction of a less onerous stan-
dard for establishing subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS. In
2007, the Ninth Circuit stated that a “district court [has] subject
matter jurisdiction under the [ATS] so long as plaintiffs alleged a
nonfrivolous claim by an alien for a tort in violation of interna-
tional law.”103 Under this more flexible formulation, the compara-
tive ease of establishing subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS
is evident. There is no need to establish U.S.-based conduct or a
chain of events leading to substantial effects occurring on U.S. soil.
Provided that the alleged activity falls within the category of a viola-
tion of the law of nations, the plaintiff will be able to proceed to
discovery and to the merits of the case.
Wiwa provides an instructive example of the differential be-
tween ATS and RICO with regard to establishing extraterritorial
jurisdiction. As mentioned, the RICO claims in Wiwa foundered
based on the plaintiffs’ inability to establish extraterritorial subject
matter jurisdiction. The ATS claims, by contrast, were allowed to
proceed. The court held that the plaintiffs had met the standard of
adequately pleading a “widely accepted, clearly defined violation of
the law of nations.”104 In this instance, given the nature of some of
the crimes alleged (including killings and torture), the burden was
not substantial. But the ability for the plaintiffs to plead claims
which concerned only the defendant’s conduct abroad—rather
than the ripple of connections it produced or the larger corporate
motive for the conduct—substantially lessened the difficulty of es-
tablishing subject matter jurisdiction. The survival of the ATS
claims ultimately proved paramount. Royal Dutch Shell settled with
the plaintiffs out of court, agreeing to provide the plaintiffs with
99 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
100 Fila´rtiga v. Pen˜a-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, (2d Cir. 1980).
101 See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.
102 Id.
103 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1201 (9th Cir. 2007).
104 See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 6, at 156.
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$15.5 million to “establish a trust for the benefit of the Ogoni peo-
ple, and cover some of the legal costs and fees associated with the
case.”105
From the perspective of a litigator, the lessons emerging from
these cases are clear. First, from what limited rulings are available,
the test to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction has yet to be met in
a case where human rights allegations are being brought. Pleading
a broad effect on profitability is not sufficient. Second, the stan-
dards that courts have articulated are onerous, requiring substan-
tial analysis and discovery on the part of the litigator at an early
stage of the case—well before the merits of the substantive RICO
claims can be addressed. Finally, by comparison to the standards of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction via the ATS, RICO is espe-
cially cumbersome.
PART IV. RICO’S LIMITATIONS AS A METHOD OF ASCRIBING
DIRECT LIABILITY
If the obstacles regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction can even-
tually be overcome, there is, as mentioned, a limited class of plain-
tiffs who would be able to benefit from RICO’s remedial options.
These plaintiffs, however, are unlikely to discover that RICO pro-
vides litigators with a more direct avenue of ascribing liability to
corporations involved in human rights abuses. Although the ex-
pansive scope of RICO’s “enterprise” once suggested that courts
might draw a wide net over players involved at the periphery of an
enterprise’s activities, domestic case law has substantially curtailed
this reach. It should be noted that this question has yet to be fully
addressed by courts in an international human rights setting (as
most claims have foundered at the extraterritorial jurisdiction
stage). But there is little reason to believe courts will approach in-
ternational cases in a different manner than their domestic coun-
terparts. Litigators who file RICO claims are just as likely to face
the largely unresolved debate regarding which standards of law to
apply to complicity allegations as they would if pursuing ATS claims
alone.
A. The Once-Expansive Possibilities of the Term “Enterprise”
As previously mentioned, the term “enterprise” has been flexi-
bly construed in domestic case law. To some degree, this flexibility
105 Commentary on Wiwa et al v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/wiwa-v.-royal-dutch-petroleum
(last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
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pertains to not only the type of organization at issue, but also the
size and scope of its participants. Litigators may choose, for exam-
ple, to stretch the conception of an enterprise broadly so as to en-
compass a wide array of possible participants, or they may draw a
narrower conception of the core enterprise and rely on the con-
spiracy elements of the Act to implicate actors on the periphery. In
past litigation regarding corporate violations of RICO, this flexibil-
ity depended largely on the theory by which litigators (and courts)
chose to define a corporation. The “nexus of contracts theory,” for
example, posits that a corporation is composed merely of a series
of interconnected contracts—employees, managers, customers,
and suppliers are joined by contracts which, in aggregate, form a
functioning corporation.106 If placed in the context of RICO litiga-
tion, this construction once held expansive possibilities. Litigators
might have placed both the contracted service providers and the
corporation that had engaged their services under the same “enter-
prise” umbrella. Doing so would have enabled litigators to charge
both the service providers (local security forces, for example) as
well as the corporation itself, with a direct violation of RICO, ren-
dering allegations of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or vicarious
liability, unnecessary. Critically, the possibility of dispensing with
complicity charges would not only enable litigators to pursue a less
convoluted pathway of ascribing liability, but would also allow them
to sidestep the unresolved choice of law debate regarding whether
to apply domestic or international standards of complicity liability.
B. The Narrow Construction Featured in Reves
Recent case law concerning RICO’s domestic application,
however, suggests that courts are likely to pursue a narrow con-
struction of how far the term “enterprise” can be stretched. This
strict approach would derail legal strategies that had sought to
ascribe liability directly, rather than via conspiracy allegations. In
Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court established the “opera-
tion or management test” which required that, in order for an indi-
vidual to be held directly liable for a violation of RICO, the
individual must have had some role in conducting or managing
the enterprise.107 The Reves case involved the relationship between
the auditing firm Arthur Young (prior to its evolution into Ernst &
106 Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, in particular, has been a lead-
ing proponent of the nexus of contracts theory. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 72 (1991).
107 507 U.S. 170, 173, 183–84 (1993).
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Young), and the manager of a farmer’s cooperative that had en-
countered financial trouble. The auditors had made several “ques-
tionable decisions” regarding how best to value the assets of the
cooperative, creating an inflated valuation that led to subsequent
confusion and financial reliance by the cooperative’s trustees.108
Among other allegations, the plaintiffs in the case alleged that the
cooperative and the auditor had committed a violation of RICO as
members of a common enterprise.109 The Eighth Circuit granted
summary judgment in favor of the auditor, and on appeal the Su-
preme Court upheld the decision, opting for a more restrictive in-
terpretation of the RICO “enterprise” than those earlier
announced by the Eleventh Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit.110
The Court’s analysis focused in particular on the language in
section 1962(c), which makes it illegal for a person to “conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise’s affairs.”111 The Court’s interpretation concluded that if indi-
viduals who were mere participants in the enterprise could be held
liable, the word “conduct” becomes essentially superfluous.112 As
such, rather than read “conduct” out of the statute entirely, the
Court concluded that the term “participate” was modified by the
phrase “[in the] conduct of such enterprise’s affairs.”113 The Court
thereby concluded that Congress had intended to focus on individ-
uals who had a controlling or influencing role in the conduct of
the organization, rather than on mere participants.114 Following
the ruling, some commentators have remarked that “the decision
heralded an end to the liability of so-called ‘outsiders,’ including
lawyers, accountants, and various other professionals sometimes
pulled into RICO suits.”115
108 Id. at 174.
109 Id.
110 Reves, 507 U.S. at 185–88 (citing Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs &
Helpers Local Union, 639, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust &
Sav. Ass’n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986)).
111 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
112 See Reves, 507 U.S. at 182.
113 Id. at 178–79 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
114 Curiously, the Court’s interpretation appears to have read “participate” largely
out of the statute instead. A strong argument could be made that emphasis on the
term “conduct” should not be so emphatic as to completely drown out an express
provision in the statute. For an argument that Reves was not only correctly decided but
should also apply to the conspiracy prong of RICO, see Sarah Baumgartel, The Crime
of Associating with Criminals? An Argument for Extending the Reves “Operation or Manage-
ment” Test to RICO Conspiracy, 97 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2006).
115 Id. at 2. Others, however, while acknowledging the obvious limitations that the
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In Reves, the Supreme Court’s interpretation allowed a service
contractor—an auditor in that instance—to escape the “enter-
prise” umbrella. As a consequence, litigators were left having to
plead allegations of conspiracy and accomplice liability, strategies
which, had they been applied in the international context, would
have embroiled litigators in the familiar choice of law debate sur-
rounding ATS litigation. Placed in the context of a case involving
corporate engagement in international abuses, the Reves standard
presents clear limitations. In the instance of a service contractor
hired by a multinational extraction company, for example, the
Reves ruling would likely thwart any arguments that alleged that the
contractor and the corporation were part of a common enterprise.
It could be argued that a corporation that has actively acquired
services should be characterized as the controlling or managing in-
dividual in the broader enterprise. Yet courts are likely to demand
evidence that depicts the hiring corporation as the controlling or
influencing participant in the pattern of racketeering itself. An in-
dividual who conducts or manages the security force that commit-
ted the abuses is almost certain to fall into this category. But it
appears unlikely that the contracting corporation for whom they
perform those services will also be implicated.
A thorough evaluation of the ways in which proving conspiracy
liability under RICO may differ from proving aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS lies beyond the scope of this analysis. It
bears mentioning, however, that it is not at all clear that RICO is a
better option in this regard either. The Court’s ruling in Reves was
silent as to whether the management or operations test was also
applicable to RICO’s conspiracy provision. This silence leaves liti-
gators with the existing precedent for establishing conspiracy
under RICO as originally articulated in United States v. Neapolitan.116
It requires that litigators prove the existence of both “an agree-
ment to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise” and
also “an agreement to the commission of at least two predicate
acts.”117 The Neapolitan ruling placed considerable emphasis on dis-
tancing this standard from one based solely on association, stating,
“[i]f either aspect of the agreement is lacking then there is insuffi-
ruling created, maintain that the holding was largely context dependant. As such, “to
the extent that a particular professional’s services, as compared to an auditor’s, are
intimately connected with management, Reves will provide less protection.” Jeffrey
Shapiro, Attorney Liability under RICO § 1962(c) after Reves v. Ernst & Young, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1153, 1153–54 (1994).
116 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986).
117 Id. at 498–99.
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cient evidence that the defendant embraced the objective of the
alleged conspiracy . . . mere association with the enterprise would
not constitute an actionable 1962(d) violation.”118
In aggregate, the “operation or management test” has substan-
tially constricted the ability of domestic litigators to envelop pe-
ripheral players—such as contracting parties—into the core
“enterprise.” More importantly, this restriction suggests that, con-
trary to initial appearances, RICO does not provide a more direct
route of ascribing liability. The likely outcome, as scholars have
suggested, is that “plaintiffs will more often plead aiding and abet-
ting and conspiracy theories of liability.”119 As a result, litigators
who use RICO against multinational corporations will likely find
themselves embroiled in a similar choice of law debate as that
which they would have faced in pursuance of ATS claims alone.
CONCLUSION
RICO has become a potent resource for corporate litigation in
U.S. courts, and the intuitive appeal of RICO in context of corpo-
rate multinational litigation is clear. From the time of its inception
as a tool for combating the mafia and other organized crime syndi-
cates, it has enjoyed applicability to a wide array of activities and
entities. Moreover, when considering that corporate-based ATS liti-
gation strategies have been increasingly confronted with a complex
and unresolved choice of law debate regarding conspiracy law, the
search for alternative legal strategies is understandable. While Ki-
obel may not have germinated this trend, it has certainly added a
sense of urgency.
With few exceptions, however, the early intuitions regarding
RICO have proven misguided. An analysis of RICO’s potential util-
ity in litigation against abuses committed by corporations abroad
reveals that the Act offers few advantages. RICO provides narrow
remedial opportunities, is burdened by a substantially more oner-
ous test for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction than the ATS,
and is unlikely to allow for a more direct pathway of ascribing lia-
bility to corporate defendants in international locations.  This anal-
ysis should not be interpreted, however, so as to suggest that RICO
has no applicability in the context of international corporate litiga-
118 Id.
119 See Shapiro, supra note 115, at 1173 n.95 (citing C. Stephen Howard, Payne L.
Templeton, & Devan D. Beck, RICO Claims Against Accountants After Reves v. Ernst &
Young, in 467 LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
291 (1993)).
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tion. In instances where a plaintiff has suffered economic harm in
the form of injury to property or business, RICO offers valuable
remedial alternatives. In these cases, RICO should be strongly con-
sidered as a potential adjunct tactic to other legal strategies.
RICO doesn’t suffice as a replacement for the ATS.  Barring a
reversal of Kiobel in the months to come, employing RICO without
careful forethought is likely to lead litigators down a time consum-
ing and resource intensive pathway.
